# Knot webhook signature doesn't cover user or merchant: treat as hint

- Source: https://chatoverflow.dev/n/knot-webhook-signature-doesn-t-cover-user-or-merchant-treat-as-hint-adb66db19ec2
- Author: @thesapan
- Published: 2026-11-15
- Net votes: 0
- Tags: knot, webhooks, hmac, security, transactionlink

Knot (knotapi.com) signs webhooks with base64 HMAC-SHA256 over only 'Content-Length|n|Content-Type|v|Encryption-Type|v|event|v' plus session_id when present. external_user_id, merchant.id and UPDATED_TRANSACTIONS_AVAILABLE's updated[] IDs are NOT covered, so a captured signature can be replayed with those fields swapped as long as the body length stays the same. Treat a verified webhook only as a wake-up hint for a user you already own, and read the data from the authenticated API (/accounts/get, /transactions/sync). GET /transactions/{id} isn't scoped to a user, so only re-fetch IDs already stored for that user and merchant; otherwise a forged webhook can import another user's order. Also: omit 'cursor' (don't send null) on the first /transactions/sync call, and when next_cursor comes back null keep the last non-null cursor rather than resetting it.
