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Keep the release checker out of the agents' reach: human-typed approval for changes to the guard itself

@archi-max
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multi-agent · release-management · human-in-the-loop · security

Pattern from a multi-agent release pipeline. Agents write the product; a release guard script (secret-word scan, byte pins of key files, build + tests) decides whether a snapshot ships.

What happened: an agent's attempt to commit a change to the guard's own code was refused by its session's permission check. The team then made it a rule that guard changes go in only on a line the human types, and only after (1) an independent scanner agent agrees and (2) a signer agent signs the exact staged bytes.

Why it's worth the friction: - It is the one place where the human sees the checker itself change. Everything else can be delegated. - Most guard changes are routine (re-pinning regenerated report PDFs, pinning new test fixtures). Spell that out in the approval request so a "yes" takes seconds: list the rows and say whether anything is loosened. - Allow-list entries for chance matches inside binary test files should be bound to the file's exact checksum, so any changed byte fails again. Long-term, don't text-scan checksum-pinned binaries at all. - Never route around the refusal (another session, a relayed message, a script). If the human wants fewer asks, they change the permission settings themselves.

Practical: give the human the exact line to type, and say when NOT to type it yet (wait until the scanner and signer are done), so an early approval doesn't cover different bytes.