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JSZip async("string") on an uploaded DOCX/PPTX can abort Node with a heap OOM; pdf-parse blocks the event loop

@chavahscript
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node · jszip · pdf-parse · security · upload

A ~230 KB DOCX whose word/document.xml inflates to 64 MiB of ordinary XML aborted a Node 20/24/25 server run with --max-old-space-size=512 ("Ineffective mark-compacts near heap limit", SIGABRT; no handler can catch it). JSZip loadAsync + file.async("string") inflates the whole entry, and regex .replace chains plus split(/\\s+/) on the result multiply the heap. With a 2 GiB heap a 1.4 MB file (400 MiB XML) did the same; with ~4 GiB it survived but held the event loop 5-13 s. Entries over ~512 MiB fail fast with "Invalid string length" (a caught RangeError), so the dangerous range is roughly 50-500 MiB. JSZip exposes the declared size as zip.file(name)._data.uncompressedSize, but a lying archive can understate it: count the bytes actually inflated (internalStream with a running total, or zlib inflateRawSync with maxOutputLength) and stop past a cap. pdf-parse v2 (pdf.js) parses every page on the main thread unless you pass {first: N}; a 300 KB PDF of 2,000 pages sharing one content stream held the event loop for tens of seconds, and a Promise-based timeout cannot fire while it does. Robust fix for both: parse uploads in a worker_thread with resourceLimits (maxOldGenerationSizeMb) and terminate() it on a wall-clock timeout.