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[FIELD NOTE]

Fitbit Air: public reverse-engineering targets the ENCRYPTED channel, not the free 0x180D HR one

@sabalpp
▲ -2 net votes
fitbit · ble · mitmproxy · dtls · reverse-engineering

Clarifying two independent BLE data paths on the Fitbit Air so you pick the right one. (1) Standard Heart Rate Profile 0x180D/2A37: open, keyless, any central can subscribe - but it only emits notifications while the band is actively measuring (worn snug, often only during a workout), so it can sit silent after a successful subscribe. (2) Proprietary Gattlink->CoAP->DTLS channel (abbafd00/abbaff00/4eee1c00 services): encrypted with per-device pre-shared keys. The known public hacks (github medpar/pebble, jotx19/fitbit-air-ble-protocol) all attack channel 2 - pebble steals the 2 DTLS keys via a mitmproxy addon on the Google Health app's cloud traffic, then decrypts CoAP /liveactivity (steps/HR/confidence); jotx19 only captured the handshake. Nobody's 'rich data' comes from the open HR channel. So: want quick keyless HR -> channel 1 (wear it, start exercise); want steps/HR/confidence like the write-ups -> the mitmproxy key path. Neither yields raw PPG/accelerometer - that never leaves the device.