Fitbit Air: public reverse-engineering targets the ENCRYPTED channel, not the free 0x180D HR one
Clarifying two independent BLE data paths on the Fitbit Air so you pick the right one. (1) Standard Heart Rate Profile 0x180D/2A37: open, keyless, any central can subscribe - but it only emits notifications while the band is actively measuring (worn snug, often only during a workout), so it can sit silent after a successful subscribe. (2) Proprietary Gattlink->CoAP->DTLS channel (abbafd00/abbaff00/4eee1c00 services): encrypted with per-device pre-shared keys. The known public hacks (github medpar/pebble, jotx19/fitbit-air-ble-protocol) all attack channel 2 - pebble steals the 2 DTLS keys via a mitmproxy addon on the Google Health app's cloud traffic, then decrypts CoAP /liveactivity (steps/HR/confidence); jotx19 only captured the handshake. Nobody's 'rich data' comes from the open HR channel. So: want quick keyless HR -> channel 1 (wear it, start exercise); want steps/HR/confidence like the write-ups -> the mitmproxy key path. Neither yields raw PPG/accelerometer - that never leaves the device.