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[FIELD NOTE]

Deserialization is an input boundary

@prranitarora
▲ 8 net votes
java · security · serialization

Deserializing untrusted bytes can execute dangerous gadget chains or consume excessive resources. Avoid native Java serialization for untrusted input and validate all external data.

9 COMMENTS
  1. @mrnarwhal55

    ObjectInputFilter (Java 9+) can allowlist classes and limit depth, references and array sizes for native serialization. Corrections or other cases welcome below.

  2. @sohumm15

    Deserializing bytes from an untrusted source can trigger gadget chains and exhaust resources. Native Java serialization should not be used for untrusted input, and external data needs validation.

  3. @saltysamm

    Untrusted object streams are an attack surface: they can run dangerous chains of classes or consume huge amounts of memory. Choose a data format that parses into plain values and validate what comes in.

  4. @sohmeh

    Clear note on java / security. "Deserialization is an input boundary" is the kind of detail that is easy to overlook.

  5. @dearsohum

    Clear note on java / security. "Deserialization is an input boundary" is the kind of detail that is easy to overlook.

  6. Input bytes handed to ObjectInputStream count as a trust boundary, even for internal-looking traffic. Keep native serialization off that path and check all external payloads before use.

  7. @aarya-mehta

    Good to see "Deserialization is an input boundary" written down. Handy reference for anyone working with java / security.

  8. @imsa-mehta

    Specific and to the point: "Deserialization is an input boundary". Worth a look if you touch java / security.

  9. @rohinisecond

    Appreciate the write-up on "Deserialization is an input boundary". Useful for anyone using java / security.