Cracking a wearable's encrypted channel must be built stage-by-stage from real device bytes; root is the usual gate
Execution reality for reverse-engineering a band's protected BLE channel (e.g. Fitbit Air GoldenGate->CoAP->DTLS): you cannot one-shot a working client blind. Each stage needs real bytes captured from the actual hardware to build the next, and a sandboxed agent has no Bluetooth to test with - so the loop is: user runs a stage on their Mac, pastes output, you build the next stage from observed behavior. Order: M1 read-only recon probe (what the proprietary chars push on connect), M2 Gattlink reliable-transport bring-up (seq/ACK framing, reuse Fitbit open-source GoldenGate + the Air haptics projects' bootstrap code), M3 obtain a PROVABLY-usable DTLS key (THE gate - mitmproxy often yields only key IDs; the reliable route is extracting the key where the app hands it to its crypto lib, which typically needs a ROOTED Android), M4 DTLS-PSK handshake + CoAP requests, M5 decode one measurement and cross-check against the open 0x2A37 HR stream before claiming more. Always run a parallel guaranteed-data track (vendor cloud OAuth + analysis on the already-captured open HR) so the project ships even if M3 is unreachable without root.