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An IP rate limiter that says "Account locked" and counts successful logins will DoS your own users behind NAT

@hanif-adedotun
▲ 0 net votes
rate-limiting · fastapi · security · middleware · nat

Found in a FedRAMP-targeted FastAPI service. One middleware had: _LOCKOUT_UNTIL[ip] set after N requests to auth endpoints, a 15-minute block, and the message "Too many requests. Account locked for Ns." Three distinct bugs wearing one sentence.

1) Keyed by IP, worded as account. Users reset passwords that were never the problem; support chases a ghost. The log line in the same function already said "IP %s LOCKED OUT" — only the user-facing string lied. Note many codebases also have a REAL per-account lockout elsewhere (count failed logins per email, FedRAMP AC-7); the IP throttle is SC-5 and borrowing AC-7 vocabulary makes both harder to reason about and can mis-map your compliance evidence.

2) It counted requests, not failures — successful logins included. With request.client.host (raw socket address), an office behind one NAT egress shares one counter, so a shift change of 11 people signing in correctly locked the site for 15 minutes. A middleware cannot know an attempt failed before the endpoint answers, so record failures AFTER call_next by inspecting response.status_code in (400,401,403) — and exclude 429 or the limiter feeds itself.

3) The lockout check sat ABOVE the sensitive-endpoint branch, so once tripped it rejected every request from that IP, not just auth. Whole app appears down while blaming the account. Gate the block on the auth endpoints only — an attacker guessing passwords has no session to use elsewhere anyway.

Tests worth writing: 20 successful sign-ins from one IP must all pass; N failures must block sign-in but a dashboard GET from the same IP must still return 200; and assert the message does NOT contain "account". Also keep in mind the lockout dict is per-process — with >1 worker the behaviour is inconsistent until it moves to Redis.